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Article
Cross-Border Obstacles and Solutions for
Pan-European Pensions
Hans van Meerten, Ph.D. works at Holland Financial Centre.
Bastiaan Starink, Pensions Actuarial & Insurance Services Group of PwC Tax Lawyers in Amsterdam.
Pensions are currently at the top of the agenda of companies, employees, pension carriers, governments and, last but not least, the
European Commission. This is partly because of the economic crisis pension funds are in right now but also because of the ageing
population and the impact on public treasuries. These problems however cannot be solved easily. A well-functioning internal market for
pan-European pensions without tax barriers can however contribute in solving the current pension crisis. In this article the authors
describe the current situation and legislation regarding cross-border pension carriers and pension schemes within the EU. Since taxation
is still one of the largest barriers for a well-functioning internal market for pension schemes, this aspect gets a lot of attention of the
authors. They do not only describe current legislation and recommend changes; they also present a solution which is already being
developed and is in line with current legislation: a multi-country tax-efficient pension scheme.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of one of the largest financial crises in history,
pensions became an issue foremost in people’s minds.
The focus on pensions is not, however, prompted by the
positive state of the pension market. Rather to the con-
trary, the way in which the Netherlands and many other
EU Member States and countries have structured their
pension systems is now under severe pressure. This is
obviously due first of all to an omnipresent problem:
ageing. The number of pension beneficiaries is seeing
higher proportionate increases than the economically
active population that is needed to fund the pension
benefits.1 Secondly, there are all manner of more specific,
Member State-related factors to consider. In the Nether-
lands, the unique system in its current form comes with a
set of problems.2 But also other countries that operate
more traditional pension schemes find themselves faced
with changes no matter what (see below).
The challenge that confronts EU Member States war-
rants a revision of the pension system – in some cases
fundamentally so.3 Such a revision cannot be implemen-
ted on a national level only. After all, the European Union
now has influence over practically every aspect of pension
policy, which is a natural progression from the ‘four
freedoms’ and their incremental scope. What follows are
a few examples. The European Court of Justice (‘the
Court’) has qualified pension funds as undertakings for
the purposes of – what is now – the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Treaty,4
although they are entrusted with the operation of services
of general economic interest for the purposes of Arti-
cle 106(2) of the Treaty. The Court ruled more recently
that certain German local authorities are required to
observe tendering guidelines in awarding service con-
tracts for occupational pensions.5 Also where tax aspects
are concerned, the Court has ruled repeatedly that place
of the registered office of a pension institution shall not
affect the tax deductibility of pension contributions.6 The
last example we will mention is – not unimportantly – the
introduction of the Pension Directive in 2003.7 This
Directive represented the first step towards a Europe-
wide organized market for occupation retirement provi-
sions. At present, in 2010, we can establish, however,
that this internal market has hardly come off the ground
until now. We will address this issue in more detail
below.
 This article has been written under personal title and any opinions
expressed are solely those of the author.
 Bastiaan Starink works in the Pensions, Actuarial & Insurance Ser-
vices Group of PwC Tax Lawyers in Amsterdam and is a doctoral
candidate at the Competence Centre for Pension Research of the
Tilburg University.
1 See for an elaboration: the Commission’s Ageing Communication of
29 Apr. 2009: ‘Dealing with the impact of an ageing population in
the EU’, COM (2009) 180 final.
2 See for an elaboration (in Dutch): J.G.E. van Leeuwen, ‘Een sterke
tweede pijler. Naar een toekomstbestendig stelsel van aanvullende
pensioenen’, Onderneming & Financiering 2 (2010): 137–157.
3 In the Netherlands, the Labour Foundation presented the Pension
Accord Spring 2010 on 4 Jun. 2010. This Accord proposes funda-
mental changes in occupational pensions in the second pillar.
4 Case C-67/96, Albany International, ECR 1999, I-5751, Cases
C-115/97 to 117/97, Brentjens, ECR 1999, I-6025 and Case C-219/
97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken, ECR 1999, I-61.
5 Case C-271/08, Commission/Germany, ECR 2010, I-0000. This
might yet lead to problems in Germany. As far as we understand,
German law bans foreign pension institutions (IORPs) from offering
German pension schemes. Before being able to offer German pension
schemes, foreign administrators are required to opt for a German
Durchführungsweg im Sinne des § 1b Abs. 2 bis 4 des Betriebsrentenge-
setzes in accordance with § 118e (3) of the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz
in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 17. Dezember 1992 (BGBl.
1993 I s. 2). See also H. van Meerten, ‘Pensions Reform in the
European Union: Recent Developments after the Implementation of
the IORP Directive’, Pensions: An International Journal 4 (2009):
259–272.
6 See, for instance, Case C-150/04, Commission/Denmark, ECR 2007,
I-01163.
7 Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 3 Jun. 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for
occupational retirement provision, OJEU, 2003, L 235, 10–21.
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The European Commission now considers addressing
the pension issue as a priority. In 2010, it published a
Green Paper entitled ‘towards adequate, sustainable and
safe European pension systems’ (‘the Green Paper’).8 The
Commission had already pronounced the future of pen-
sions a key priority in the legislative programme for
2010.9 The Green Paper identifies a number of challenges
that lie ahead of the EU Member States over the next few
years. In addition to the aforementioned ageing (and the
problems directly related to it),10 these would include
changes to pension systems,11 the impact of the financial
and economic crisis,12 and removing obstacles to mobi-
lity in the EU. The Commission takes a cautious
approach. It states explicitly that Member States are
responsible for pension provision and that the Green
Paper does not question Member States’ prerogatives in
pensions or the role of social partners.13 The Commission
has initiated a public debate to consult with all stake-
holders about the identified challenges.14
In this article, we will focus on a number of obstacles
that stand in the way of an internal market for occupa-
tional retirement provision. Pension funds are an integral
part of financial markets and their design can promote or
inhibit the free movement of labour or capital.15 A well-
functioning internal market does not have any unjustified
national obstacles that inhibit the free movement of pen-
sion institutions guaranteeing the level playing field
between EU Member States on the one hand and financial
institutions (banks, insurance companies and pension
funds) on the other. In our article, we will address the
obstacles that we feel, based on our experience, play a key
role in keeping the internal market from developing,16
that is:
– lack of clarity on the concept of ‘cross-border activity’
(section 3.1);
– differences in substantive and institutional European
and national supervision (section 3.2);
– tax impediments for cross-border pension institutions,
pension schemes and workers (section 3.3).
For a proper understanding of the issue, we have
provided some background information below.
In paragraph 4, we will describe a possible scenario
that might be useful for multinational companies and
their pension funds.
2. BACKGROUND
In 2003, the European legislature issued a directive on
the activities and supervision of institutions for occu-
pational retirement provision (IORPs).17 The Directive
defines an IORP18 as ‘an institution, irrespective of its
legal form, operating on a funded basis, established sepa-
rately from any sponsoring undertaking or trade for the
purpose of providing retirement benefits in the context of
an occupational activity’.19
A few elements need further clarification.
First, it is important to note that there are three main
categories of pension schemes in the EU Member
States: social security schemes (first pillar), occupational
schemes (second pillar) and individual schemes (third
pillar).Occupational schemes generally involve employer
and employees paying into a savings scheme, out of
which retirement benefits will be paid to these same
employees. IORPs can only operate occupational
schemes.
Second, we can distinguish between funded schemes
and pay-as-you-go schemes (PAYG). In a PAYG system,
benefits are financed by current contributions. No capital
is kept in reserve. In funded pension schemes a capital
reserve is created during the accrual period. This reserve
is used to fund future benefits.
Third, roughly speaking, funded pension schemes can
either take the form of a Defined Benefit (DB) scheme or a
Defined Contribution (DC) scheme.20 The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom are the forerunners in the EU
where DB schemes are concerned. New EU Member
States mostly operate DC schemes. The main difference
between the two pension schemes lies in who bears the
investment risk. In a DB scheme, the sponsor (usually the
employer) bears the risk; in a DC scheme, the individual
member (usually the employee) bears the risk. In other
words, a member of a DB scheme is ‘guaranteed’ a certain
pension benefit whereas, for a member of a DC scheme,
the level of contributions, rather than the final benefit, is
pre-defined. DB schemes are usually more complex than
DC schemes. A DB scheme, which pre-defines the pen-
sion benefit, resembles an insurance product, that is, a life
insurance. A DC scheme is similar to promises made by
investment institutions, which do not usually give firm
guarantees on investment returns. The difference
between DB and DC scheme has implications for the
supervision structure. Financial supervision of DC
8 COM 2010, 365, final.
9 COM 2010, 135, final.
10 For instance: women outlive men. Should they still be treated
equally?
11 This includes raising the retirement age, potentially rewarding late
retirement and discouraging early retirement.
12 To quote the European Commission: ‘By demonstrating the inter-
dependence of the various schemes and revealing weaknesses in
some scheme designs the crisis has acted as a wake-up call for all
pensions, whether PAYG or funded: higher unemployment, lower
growth, higher national debt levels and financial market volatility
have made it harder for all systems to deliver on pension promises’,
Green Paper.
13 It is unclear where those prerogatives begin and end exactly. As
mentioned, EU policy affects practically every aspect of ‘pension
policy’.
14 A website was launched especially for this purpose: ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?langId¼en&catId¼89&newsId¼839&furtherNews¼yes.
15 Quoted from the Green Paper.
16 The potential obstacles are plentiful and virtually impossible to
grasp. As there is hardly any harmonization in many fields, we have
had to select a number of areas. Schouten already discussed a
number of obstacles relating to cross-border pension administration
by insurance companies. In his opinion, the key reasons why pen-
sion insurers undertake hardly any cross-border activities are differ-
ences in applicable law, provisions of general interest, varying tax
rules and market-related differences. See (in Dutch) E. Schouten,
‘Grensoverschrijdende pensioenen bij verzekeraars: grote verschil-
len tussen theorie en praktijk’, Pensioen & Praktijk 7, no. 8 (2009):
6–13.
17 Directive 2003/41/EC.
18 This acronym is used throughout the article.
19 Article 6, IORP Directive.
20 All manner of hybrid schemes are possible as well.
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schemes can be less complex in structure as there is no
need for buffers. After all, in pure DC schemes, no pen-
sion promises are made to members; the risk lies with the
members/employees.
In the Netherlands, the first pillar is the state old-age
pension (Dutch acronym: AOW). Every person with
social insurance cover in the Netherlands accrues 2%
of a full state pension per annum. A full state pension
right is earned after fifty years (currently between the ages
of 15 and 65). The state old-age pension is a PAYG
system.
Having said this, the European Commission meant for
the Directive to tackle the issue of ageing. Many EU
Member States have not yet introduced the PAYG method
into their pension systems by which current contribu-
tions are used to finance current pension expenditure.
Due to ageing, the contributions are often not high
enough to cover this expenditure and any shortfalls will
have to be cleared using public funds. Given the fact that
many governments face budget deficits, our argument
that funded pension systems will become the standard
in future will come as no surprise.
The implementation date of the IORP Directive
expired at the end of 2005. Since then, all the existing
pension funds in the Member States can be classified as
IORPs.
Several Member States however have used the Direc-
tive to establish new IORPs.21 Belgium has introduced the
Organisation for Financing Pensions (OFP), Luxembourg
has instituted the Pension Savings Company with Vari-
able Capital (SEPCAV), and Ireland has established a
Private Pension Fund. Initiatives are being developed in
the Netherlands as well. In 2008/2009, the Dutch Minis-
tries of Social Affairs and Employment and Finance
drafted a law introducing a financial pension institution,
that is, the Premium Pension Institution (Dutch acronym:
PPI).22 A PPI is an IORP that focuses on administrating
DC schemes.23 A PPI will be a new pension administrator
wedged between existing financial institutions and pen-
sion funds. A PPI is a hybrid of different types of institu-
tions with features of an insurer (more specifically the
savings bank), of a standard Dutch pension fund and of
an investment institution. In keeping with this, the
statutory framework for PPIs is twofold: PPIs are gov-
erned by the Dutch Financial Supervision Act and by
the Dutch Pensions Act. By offering these new vehicles,
Member States are trying to present themselves as an
attractive domicile for IORPs.
Expectations are that pension pooling – with multi-
nationals, for instance, having all different pension
schemes of their globally based workforce administrated
by a single pension administrator – will become a popular
option.24 A recent feasibility study for creating an EU
pension fund for researchers confirms this expectation.25
In this study it can be read that it is expected that the
number (of single-employer) cross-border IORPs will
increase significantly over the next two to three years
once the practice becomes more established, and more
multinationals realize that cross-border IORPs have
become a practical reality at last.
The following diagram offers a snap-shot of the struc-
ture of a cross-border IORP.26
To conclude this paragraph, the Committee of Eur-
opean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS) has calculated that there are currently about 80
IORPs in operation. This marks a slow start for the time
being of the market for cross-border IORPs.27
21 Pension institutions dating from before the Directive also qualify as
IORPs.
22 In full: Amendment to the Dutch Financial Supervision Act and
some other acts in connection to the introduction and supervision
of contributory pension institutions (Act on the Introduction of
Premium Pension Institutions), Parliamentary Documents II, 2008/
09, 31891, no. 2 (the Act) and no. 3 (Explanatory Memorandum).
23 See for a good description of this vehicle (in Dutch): R. van de Greef,
‘De PPI: een wassen of een lange neus?’, Tijdschrift voor pensioenv-
raagstukken 3 (2009): 82–86.
24 The Dutch government shares this opinion, as voiced in the Expla-
natory Memorandum.
25 Prepared by Hewitt for the European Commission Research
Directorate-General, Final Report 15 Jun. 2010 – Contract no.
RTD/DirC/C4/2009/02687944/2009/0268794.
26 Ibid.
27 CEIOPS 56/10, 24 Jun. 2010, 2010 Report on Market
Developments.
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3. OBSTACLES TO A WELL-FUNCTIONING
INTERNAL MARKET
3.1. Cross-Border Activity
There is uncertainty about the question of when IORPs
carry out cross-border activities.28 This also causes con-
fusion as to which legal system governs an IORP’s activity.
What do the relevant provisions of the IORP Directive
stipulate in relation to cross-border activities?
First and foremost, we would refer to a key provision
of the Directive, that is, Article 20(1), which reads as
follows.
Without prejudice to national social and labour legislation on
the organisation of pension systems, including compulsory
membership and the outcomes of collective bargaining agree-
ments, Member States shall allow undertakings located within
their territories to sponsor institutions for occupational retire-
ment provision authorised in other Member States. They shall
also allow institutions for occupational retirement provision
authorised in their territories to accept sponsorship by under-
takings located within the territories of other Member States.
This implies that any IORP interested in carrying out
cross-border activity is required to observe the social and
labour laws of the Member State that qualifies as the
home country of the pension scheme. In the Netherlands,
these provisions have been largely enshrined in the Dutch
Pensions Act.29 The observance of ‘foreign’ social and
labour laws poses problems when carrying out cross-
border activity. As each Member State is free to interpret
the provisions, this legislation ranges widely from coun-
try to country. At times, prudential supervision rules even
form part of social and labour laws.
A second relevant provision of the IORP Directive is
Article 20(2):
An institution wishing to accept sponsorship from a spon-
soring undertaking located within the territory of another
Member State shall be subject to a prior authorisation by the
competent authorities of its home Member State, as referred
to in Article 9(5). It shall notify its intention to accept
sponsorship from a sponsoring undertaking located within
the territory of another Member State to the competent
authorities of the home Member State where it is authorised.
This provision requires any IORP wanting to accept
sponsoring (funding) from an undertaking located within
the territory of another Member State obtaining author-
ization from the competent authorities. The Directive
qualifies this as a cross-border activity. It would seem as
if this interpretation of the concept of cross-border activ-
ity is incomplete to say the least. To illustrate, let us
consider a potential Dutch situation involving a PPI, the
new Dutch IORP.
As indicated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the
Act on the Introduction of Premium Pension Institu-
tions,30 a PPI – which is required to have its registered
office in the Netherlands31 – can, firstly, administrate
foreign pension schemes in the Netherlands (see Article
20(2), IORP Directive, cited above). A PPI can also, sec-
ondly, administrate foreign pension schemes in another
Member State by setting up an ‘infrastructure necessary
for the purposes of performing the services in question’.32
Finally and thirdly, a PPI can, via a branch office as
defined in the Dutch Financial Supervision Act,33 admin-
istrate a pension scheme in another Member State.
The three alternatives described above involve cross-
border activity that comes under the freedom to provide
services enshrined in the TFEU Treaty (Article 56) where
the first two alternatives are concerned and under the
freedom of establishment when considering the third
alternative (Article 49).
What is striking about the Explanatory Memorandum
is that the Dutch legislature uses the concept of ‘foreign
scheme’ as a reference point, rather than that of ‘foreign
undertaking’. Judging from the Parliamentary Documents,
cross-border activity is being carried out if an IORP
administrates a pension scheme that is governed by the
social and labour laws of a Member State or country other
than the IORP’s home State. In other words, the ‘scheme’s
nationality’ is the decisive criterion. Which national social
and labour laws govern the scheme is determined by the
choice-of-law rules stipulated in Article 8 of the Rome I
Regulation.34
There are some advantages to this approach. Let us
assume that the undertaking sponsoring the PPI has its
registered office in London, in the United Kingdom. In
concrete terms, this might involve a multinational that
wants to centralize the administration of its pension
schemes from a single location. We will then assume that,
under the choice-of-law rules of the Rome I Regulation,
the pension scheme is governed by Dutch social and
labour laws. This would imply that a Dutch PPI qualifies
as the administrator of a Dutch pension scheme, although
the sponsoring undertaking has its registered office in a
different Member State. It is doubtful, to say the least,
whether this situation would involve any cross-border
activity. The Member States have differing opinions on
this issue. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, an IORP is
considered as carrying out cross-border activity if a single
individual member of a pension scheme is ‘domiciled’
abroad.35 Other Member States use different criteria, for
example, the nationality of individual members.36
28 See for a more extensive discussion of this issue (in Dutch): H. van
Meerten, ‘De Premiepensioeninstelling: van, maar ook op alle markten
thuis?’, Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Europees Recht: 12 (2008): 347–355.
29 For an overview: Parliamentary Documents II, 2006/07, 1182,
appendix.
30 Explanatory Memorandum, 36.
31 The IORP Directive stipulates that the ‘home Member State’ means
the Member State in which the institution has its registered office
and its main administration or, if it does not have a registered office,
its main administration (Art. 6(i)).
32 This passage is [obviously] from the Gebhard judgment (Case C-55/
94, Gebhard, 30 Nov. 1995, ECR 1995, I-4165).
33 The definition of a branch office that is relevant here reads as
follows: ‘a section without legal personality of a financial enterprise
that is not an insurer or investment firm permanently existing in a
State other than the State where this financial enterprise has its
registered office’, s. 1:1 of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act.
34 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 Jun. 2008 on the applicable law to contractual
obligations (Rome I), OJEU, 2008, L 177.
35 J. Lommen, De API is een no-brainer. De positionering van Nederland in
de nieuwe Europese pensioenmarkt (Tilburg: Netspar, 2009), 24.
36 See for an overview by country of approaches taken: ‘Initial review
of key aspects of the implementation of the IORP Directive’, CEIOPS
Occupational Pensions Committee (OPC), 31 Mar. 2008.
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3.2. European Supervision of IORPs
Another important factor that might explain why cross-
border activities of IORPs are slow in coming off the
ground is the difference in supervision by the different
Member States of their IORPs. There are major differences
in both substantive and institutional terms.
So far, institutional supervision of financial institu-
tions (and of IORPs) has mostly been organized on
a national level. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Central
Bank (Dutch acronym: DNB) is the regulator responsible
for prudential supervision of all financial institutions
(mainly involving compliance with solvency and liquidity
requirements), while the Authority for the Financial Mar-
kets (AFM) is in charge of supervising business conduct.
This model, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘twin
peaks model’,37 has been copied in a number of other
countries. There are plenty of Member States and other
countries, however, that will not introduce segregation
between supervision of business conduct and prudential
supervision and where supervision of the insurance
sector, for instance, rests with a separate supervisory
authority.38
The EU agrees with many experts that these differ-
ences in European supervision have not particularly
reduced the implications of the crises.39 The European
legislature is now trying to further harmonize institu-
tional supervision. Judging from the proposals for a new
supervision system for the entire financial sector that
were presented late in September 2009, four new bodies
will be instituted.40 One of them is the European Insur-
ance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) for
insurers and IORPs.41 This agency is expected to be
granted broad powers. It will, for instance, be competent
to impose directly binding decisions (‘technical stan-
dards’) on qualifying institutions. However, EIOPA’s
powers are expected to be limited where regulations
governing IORPs are concerned, as the Dutch have major
doubts about the option of imposing technical standards
for supplementary pensions. The Dutch government feels
that, in drafting these standards, policy-related and poli-
tical considerations should be weighed as a rule because
of the interrelatedness between supplementary pension
rules and national social and labour laws.42
Substantive supervision has already been broadly har-
monized in a European context in some areas. Banks are
governed by the Basel II regime,43 and insurance compa-
nies are subject to the Solvency II framework.44 These
Directives define relatively detailed capital, management
and disclosure requirements, as well as regulating colla-
boration among national regulators, which might be com-
pulsory in some instances. The IORP Directive entails
minimal harmonization and regulates relatively little.
Although all pension institutions in the EU/EEA are
expected to meet the requirements set in the Directive
(e.g., Dutch pension funds qualify as IORPs), there are
substantial differences at European level between the
solvency requirements for pension funds, for instance,
due to the national interpretation and supplementation of
minimum requirements. We will consider this issue in
greater detail below.
Article 17 of the IORP Directive stipulates that home
Member States shall ensure that institutions operating
pension schemes, where the institution itself underwrites
the liability to cover against biometric risk (e.g., longevity
risk), or guarantees a given investment performance or a
given level of benefits, hold on a permanent basis addi-
tional assets above the technical provisions to serve as a
buffer (the ‘solvency margin’). This presents a new pro-
blem. After all, there is another type of institution that can
administrate pension schemes, that is, an insurer. There
are a lot of similarities between insurance companies and
pension funds.45 Insurance companies and some pension
funds (mostly those who offer DB plans) underwrite the
liability to cover risk themselves. In other words, they
both ‘insure’.
As indicated earlier, insurance companies of a certain
size are subject to Solvency II. What does the IORP
Directive say about the solvency regime of pension funds
insuring defined benefits? Article 17(2) of the IORP
Directive stipulates that, for the purposes of calculating
the minimum amount of the additional assets, the rules
laid down in Articles 27 and 28 of Directive 2002/83/EC
shall apply. This refers to Solvency I, the ‘old’ insurance
directive, which requires a buffer of just under 5% of
obligations.46 In other words, IORPs that are insuring a
certain benefit would be subject to the same rules as
insurance companies.
However, as indicated above, recently the Solvency II
Directive entered into force. The old Solvency I directives
have all been incorporated into the new Solvency
II regime in the interim. This would mean that the Sol-
vency II regime becomes applicable to IORPs. But the
37 See for a description of different supervision models: E.
Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe:
About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple
Financial Supervisors’, European Business Organization Law Review
(2007): 2.
38 Poland and Luxembourg, for instance.
39 See the recommendations of the De Larosière Group, which spoke
with experts, market specialists and regulators (ec.europa.eu/inter-
nal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm#delarosierereport).
40 See for a more extensive discussion of these proposals (in Dutch):
J.C. van Haersolte & H. van Meerten, ‘Zelfrijzend Europees bak-
meel: de voorstellen voor een nieuw toezicht op de financiële
sector’, Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Europees Recht: 2 (2010): 33–42.
41 See for a discussion of the question of whether the agencies have
been founded on the correct legal basis in the Treaty: H. Van
Meerten & A.T. Ottow, ‘The Proposals for the European Super-
visory Authorities: The Right (Legal) Way Forward?’, Tijdschrift voor
Financieel Recht 1, no. 2 (2010): 5–16. The authors conclude that
questions can be raised about the correct legal basis.
42 Parliamentary Documents II, 2009/10, 22112, No. 940.
43 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 14 Jun. 2006 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of
credit institutions, OJEU, 2006, L 177, 1–200.
44 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 25 Nov. 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of
insurance and reinsurance (Solvency II), OJEU, 2009, L 335/1.
45 There are also certain differences. See D. Broeders et al., An Institu-
tional Evaluation of Pension Funds and Life Insurance Companies
(Amsterdam: DNB Working Paper, 2009), 227.
46 Consolidated in Directive 2002/12/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 5 Mar. 2002 amending Council Directive 79/
267/EEC as regards the solvency margin requirements for life assur-
ance undertakings (OJEU, 2002, L 77) and Directive 2002/13/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 Mar. 2002 amend-
ing Council Directive 73/239/EEC as regards the solvency margin
requirements for non-life insurance undertakings (OJEU, 2002, L
77, 17–22).
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European legislature has used a stratagem. In order to
prevent the Solvency II framework applying to IORPs –
which meets with resistance from Dutch pension funds,
among others47 – the old provisions (the above men-
tioned Articles 27 and 28) of the Solvency I directives
were transposed in the new Solvency II framework as
they were, meaning that IORPs with insurance activities
effectively continue to be governed by the Solvency I
framework.
But the matter becomes even more complex as Article 4
of the IORP Directive offers an interesting option. It
allows Member States to choose to apply the provisions
of Articles 9–16 and Articles 18–20 of the IORP Directive
to the occupational retirement provision business of
insurance undertakings.48 In that case, all assets and
liabilities corresponding to this business will be ring-
fenced, managed and organized separately from the other
activities of the insurance undertakings, without any pos-
sibility of transfer. The application of Article 4 IORP can
lead to a situation in which an insurance company is split
into two separate entities: an ‘insurance’ entity and a
‘pension’ entity.
What this means is that insurance companies admin-
istrating occupational retirement provisions are subject to
Solvency II where their ‘regular’ insurance activities are
concerned (the insurance entity), that they may be sub-
ject to Solvency I – depending on the question of whether
a Member State has implemented Article 4 of the Direc-
tive – as regards their solvency regime relating to the
occupational retirement provision (the ‘pension’ entity)
and that they come under the IORP Directive in respect of
technical provisions and investment policy. As a result of
this fragmented regime, Dutch insurers may be subject to
a stricter system (Solvency II) than French insurers who
are governed by Article 4 of the IORP Directive, which
entails less stringent requirements (Solvency I) for the
same activities.49
In the Netherlands, the solvency framework for pen-
sion funds is regulated by the Financial Assessment Fra-
mework (Dutch acronym: FTK); the legislature has
implemented Article 17 of the IORP Directive such that
the minimum capital requirement for pension funds is
about 105%. The question is – somewhat as an aside –
whether the Dutch government did the right thing in
implementing Article 17 of the IORP.50 Dutch pension
funds do not bear the ultimate risks themselves after all.
In an adverse climate when funds fall short of the
required funding ratio of 105%,51 pension funds can
raise the contributions paid by employers and employees
jointly, and/or temporarily unlink pensions from wage
and price developments, or in extreme cases, even reduce
pension entitlements or write down pension rights. In
other words, employers and employees ultimately bear
the risks. The paradox is that the Dutch choice to imple-
ment Article 17 of the IORP Directive has accelerated the
unwanted application of Solvency II.52
In Belgium, the solvency calculation method of IORPs
has been described in detail in the Prudential Royal
Decree of 12 January 2007.53 Belgian law does not
require an IORP to create buffers over and above assets
funding the technical provisions and assets covering the
solvency margin.54 The Dutch and Belgian regimes – but
the other national regimes as well – are substantially
different from one another.55 The differences in super-
vision (of solvency) between the Netherlands and
Belgium have even been the subject of Parliamentary
questions. There were (and are)56 concerns about the
potential relocation57 of Dutch pension funds to Belgium
and Ireland.58
3.3. Tax Aspects of European Pensions
The Green Paper does not go into much detail with regard
to the tax aspects of European pensions. This is a missed
opportunity. Tax impediments currently form a major
obstacle to the internal market for occupational retire-
ment provisions: EU citizens hardly have the option to
accrue cross-border pension benefits and/or to have their
pensions administrated on a cross-border basis. This is
standing firmly in the way of allowing pension pooling as
mentioned earlier.
The potential options for, and advantages of, cross-
border pension accrual would seem tremendous. A pen-
sion administrator managing to offer several European
pension schemes from a single jurisdiction could benefit
from numerous efficiencies of scale. These would not
only include administration efficiencies (after all, a sepa-
rate pension scheme is required for each country) but
more importantly create a potential for pension pooling.
Underlying assets and liabilities could be joined and
bundled,59 for instance. It does not take an economics
degree to understand that this would generate synergies.
Pension pooling options, which are open to both pension
insurers and pension funds, can be used in particular to
capitalize on the growth of multinationals. Pension pool-
ing will allow undertakings with branches in different
47 See for a discussion the Position Paper of the pensions industry
umbrella organisations: ‘Extension of Solvency II to pension funds is
unwarranted’<www.vbportal.nl/bibliotheekvb/grp4/Position%20Paper
%20Solvency.pdf>.
48 Some Member States (e.g., France) have availed themselves of this
option, others (including the Netherlands) have not (Parliamentary
Documents II, 2004/05, 30 104, no. 3, 7).
49 As Solvency II has stricter (regulated) capital requirements as well as
being more risk-oriented, it imposes more requirements on insurers
than does Solvency I. See M. Lechkar, O. Nijenhuis & H. van
Meerten, ‘The Solvency II Directive: The Long and Winding Road’,
Verzekeringsarchief 4 (2009): 162–166.
50 See (in Dutch) B. Kuipers, ‘solvency II ongeschikt voor pensioen-
fondsen’, Tijdschrift voor Pensioenvraagstukken 2 (2009): 53–58.
51 In July 2010, the funding ratio at ABP, the largest pension fund in
the Netherlands, was 95%. See (in Dutch): <www.fd.nl>, 18 Jul.
2010.
52 See B. Kuipers supra n. 50.
53 Royal Decree on the Prudential Supervision of Institutions for
Occupational Retirement Provision, Belgian Bulletin of Acts and
Decrees, 23 Jan. 2007.
54 See (in Dutch) A. Van Damme, J. Beernaert, J.A. Gielink & C.A.
Hoekstra, ‘Het pan-Europees pensioenfonds: een Belgisch-
Nederlandse kijk op de zaak’, Tijdschrift voor pensioenvraagstukken
1 (2008): 2–14.
55 See B. Kuipers supra n. 50.
56 Holland Financial Centre, a Dutch public/private initiative, seeks to
keep Dutch IORPs in the Netherlands and to attract foreign schemes
that can be administrated by a Dutch IORP (e.g., a PPI).
57 See (in Dutch) H. van Meerten, ‘De zetelverplaatsing van dochter-
ondernemingen van financiële instellingen’, Verzekeringarchief 4
(2010), not yet published.
58 Parliamentary Documents II, 2007/08, no. 666.
59 See the diagram in para. 2.
CROSS-BORDER OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS FOR PAN-EUROPEAN PENSIONS
EC TAX REVIEW 2011/1 35
Member States, hence operating company pension funds
in several Member States, to establish an IORP in a sin-
gle Member State to administrate all different pension
schemes.
Before addressing this issue in greater detail, we will
first provide some background information about the
Dutch pension system.
3.3.1. An Adequate and Sustainable Pension
We believe that a funded pension system is preferable to a
PAYG system. In an ageing society, a funded system offers
the assets that are needed to provide pensioners with an
income. There is less pressure on general resources as
pension benefits do not have to be funded from current
contributions. This is all the more relevant in a society
with an economically active population that contributes
to GDP and pensioners who do not contribute or do so to
a lesser extent because they are able to provide for their
own income. Moreover, a funded pension system spreads
income evenly over a beneficiary’s life so that they can
enjoy an income after their service period. A funded
pension system does, however, exist by the grace of the
so-called EET system,60 a tax facility. Under this system,
contributions to a pension scheme are tax-deductible
(i.e., non-taxable or Exempt), the capital accrual of the
pension benefit is also Exempt and the effective benefits
being liable to Tax. This is how a funded pension system
that is based on the EET-system also generates tax reven-
ues for a State when pensions are in payment. This can be
considered as a plus point since, in an ageing society, tax
revenues would fall dramatically if the economically
active population were the only contributors to these
revenues. Taxing pension benefits allows States to main-
tain their revenues in a period in which ageing costs (e.g.,
healthcare costs) are generally soaring. The advantages
of a funded pension system based on the EET-system
have been recognized by the European Commission in
the past.61
Against this backdrop, we are most surprised that the
Green Paper would question the usefulness and need of
the EET system. The Green Paper states that ‘the costs of
tax relief can be considerable and its effectiveness and
redistributive impacts questionable’.62 This comment
would seem to be diametrically opposed to earlier pro-
nouncements by the European Commission.63
3.3.2. Pension Administrators, Pension
Schemes and Workers
The tax impediments mostly affect pension administra-
tors, pension schemes and EU workers.
The European Commission issued a Pension Commu-
nication in 2001.64 In it, the Commission took the view
that a foreign pension institution should qualify for tax
relief if a domestic pension institution does the same. This
view was later confirmed by the Court of Justice. It can be
concluded from the judgments in the Wielockx65 and the
Commission v. Denmark cases66 that pension contribu-
tions paid to pension administrators located in other
Member States should no longer be subject to tax discri-
mination.67 This does not mean, however, that paying
pension contributions to a foreign pension administrator
is always an option. This is a possibility only if the
pension scheme administrated by a foreign pension
administrator meets all the tax criteria that the country
providing the tax relief has imposed on the pension
scheme. And that is rarely the case in practice. What
follows is an example.
In the EU, Member States have considerable tax auton-
omy,68 the result being that Member States are free to
devise their own national tax regimes as long as they have
regard to the equality principle. This had led to most EU
Member States structuring their pension systems such
that pension contributions paid into a foreign pension
scheme do not qualify for tax relief unless that foreign
pension scheme meets their national tax rules for pen-
sions.69 In practice, this proves hardly ever to be the case
because national tax rules for pensions vary so strongly
from Member State to Member State that these rules
seldom correspond in two countries. There is no single
pension scheme that meets the tax requirements in more
than one country. In order to offer qualifying pension
schemes in different countries, a pension administrator
is forced, therefore, to offer domestic pension schemes
in several countries. This is definitely a tall order.70 In
practice, pension administrators (insurers) leave it to
their local associates or subsidiaries to serve the market
in other European countries with the law of the host
country defining the scope of the pension scheme.
The fact that a pension scheme operated in a Member
State hardly ever qualifies for tax relief in other Member
States does not, in principle, seem in contravention of
European law because the denial of tax relief is not
60 Stands for Exempt, Exempt, Taxed.
61 See <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/
pensions/index_en.htm>.
62 Green Paper, p. 7.
63 See <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/
pensions/index_en.htm>.
64 The Communication was entitled ‘The elimination of tax obstacles
to the cross-border provision of occupational pensions’, COM 2001,
214, final.
65 Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der directe belastingen, ECR
1995, I-02493.
66 Case C-150/04, Commission v. Denmark.
67 See, for more details (in Dutch), P. Schonewille, ‘Hof van Justitie
elimineert belangrijk belastingobstakel voor pan-Europese pen-
sioenfondsen en mobiele werknemers’, Pensioenmagazine, 79
(2007): 21–25.
68 See, for instance, C-96/08, CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central, ECR
2008, p. 5. Consideration 28 reads as follows: ‘It follows from this
that, in the current state of the development of European Union law,
the Member States enjoy a certain autonomy in this area provided
they comply with European Union law, and are not obliged there-
fore to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of
taxation of the other Member States in order, inter alia, to eliminate
the double taxation arising from the exercise in parallel by those
States of their fiscal sovereignty’.
69 Consideration 9 of the IORP Directive reads as follows: ‘In accor-
dance with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States should
retain full responsibility for the organisation of their pension sys-
tems as well as for the decision on the role of each of the three
‘‘pillars’’ of the retirement system in individual Member States’. The
Directive seems to confuse the subsidiarity principle with the legal
basis principle in this consideration. After all, if the Member States
should have ‘full responsibility’ for the organisation of their pension
systems, the EU would be powerless in this area. The subsidiarity
test is irrelevant if there were no legal basis for EU action.
70 See E. Schouten & H. van Meerten, 2008.
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prompted by the fact that a scheme originates in another
Member State but rather by its non-compliance with
national tax rules. Obviously, such ‘measures without
distinction’ do qualify as prohibited restrictions of the
free movement of goods and services because they form
a major obstacle to the internal market.71 Due to the
autonomy in tax matters, the principle of mutual recogni-
tion does not, however, apply for the time being in the
tax arena.
In addition to impediments for pension administra-
tors, there are for cross-border EU workers, who are
divided into mobile (posted) workers and non-mobile
workers. As far as mobile workers (who are temporarily
stationed in another Member State) are concerned, the
non-acceptance for tax purposes of the pension scheme
in their home country would seem to be in contraven-
tion of European law. This follows from the European
Commission’s Pension Communication of 2001 and the
Safeguarding Directive72 among other documents. In
order to explain this matter clearly, we shall describe
the situation.
A person lives and works in country A (home country)
and is a member of the pension scheme in country A. For
a period of time, this worker is posted in country B (host
country) but stays in the pension scheme of his employer
in country A. Whilst working in country B, the worker
falls under the tax system of country B and therefore pays
taxes, such as wage tax and/or income tax, in country B.
The pension scheme of which the worker stays a member
whilst working in country B temporarily, does not com-
ply with tax system of country B. The question therefore
is if the pension premiums into the pension scheme in
country A are tax deductible in country B. Normally, this
would not be the case because the pension scheme of
country A does not comply with the tax rules of country
B. However, the Pension Communication,73 which does
not, in principle, have any legal effects, states that the free
movement of workers would be unduly restricted if a host
state (i.e., country B) were to impose its conditions for tax
approval on a migrant worker’s pension scheme. This
would mean that the pension premium into the pension
scheme of country A is fully tax deductible in country B,
irrespective of the fact that this tax deductible premium
may be higher than locals of country B can deduct from
their taxable wage/income. Although this sounds hopeful,
the Communication also mentions that, under the equal
treatment principle, the total tax deduction that the host
state is obliged to grant would normally be limited to the
relief granted for contributions to domestic pension insti-
tutions. In other words, tax relief in country B is granted
subject to the substantive limits used by the country B. A
pension scheme does not, however, have to meet all
procedural criteria defined by the host country. There-
fore, one aspect that forms a particular impediment in
practice is the condition that the host country (i.e., coun-
try B) will grant relief only to the level that is customary in
that country. The following example serves as an illustra-
tion. The second pension pillar in the Netherlands is tax
favourable. A Dutch employee who is temporarily sta-
tioned in France, for instance, and wants to continue
their Dutch pension, would, under European law, qualify
for tax relief to the level that is customary in France. The
problem here would be that the French pension system
relies heavily on the first (state pension) pillar, offering
little tax relief for pillar-two pensions, even in purely
domestic situations. The Dutch employee would, there-
fore, have only limited tax relief in France, thereby
disqualifying themselves from tax-efficient pension
accrual.
As mentioned, in the European Commission’s view,
this situation is not in contravention of European law.
Relying on the equality principle, the Commission feels
that a worker should not qualify for any tax relief other
than that granted under the rules of the host country.74 In
literature, doubts have been raised about this reliance on
the equality principle, however. The question is, after all,
whether mobile (i.e., posted) workers should be treated
equally to non-mobile workers in the home country (i.e.,
country A) or to persons employed in the host country
(i.e., country B). Judging from the Safeguarding Directive
and Regulation 883/2004, mobile workers and non-
mobile workers in the home country should be treated
equally.75
This view would advocate unrestricted tax acceptance
of a pension scheme originating in the home country
irrespective of the amount of the contributions. Although
the Safeguarding Directive does not explicitly refer to tax
situations, the Dutch legislator allows tax relief for con-
tributions to a foreign pension scheme for up to five
years, even if the foreign scheme is broader in substance
than allowable under tax law.76 In other words, the
Netherlands (in the case of being the host state, that is,
country B) grant tax deduction for the full pension pre-
mium paid into the pension scheme of country A, even is
this means a larger deduction than domestic workers
receive in the Netherlands. With this, the Netherlands
fully respects foreign pension schemes for tax purposes as
well, having ultimate regard for the freedom of movement
for workers of Article 45 of the TFEU Treaty and setting
an example for many EU countries. The question is,
however, whether other EU Member States have the same
broad tax recognition of pension schemes of mobile
workers. This does not always prove to be so in practice.
Judging from Article 17(6) of the UK/Dutch Tax Conven-
tion, the United Kingdom does have this recognition, at
least where Dutch workers and Dutch pension schemes
are concerned.77 Belgium also offers this option, based
71 See, for instance, Case C-187/84, Commission/Germany, ECR 1987,
01227.
72 Directive 98/49/EC of 29 Jun. 1998 on safeguarding the supple-
mentary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons
moving within the Community, OJEU, L 209.
73 COM 2001.
74 COM 2000, 214, 12.
75 See for a more detailed discussion (in Dutch): L.J. Roos, Pensioen en
werknemersmobiliteit in de EU (Tilburg: Competence Centre for
Pension Research, 2006).
76 Order by the Dutch Under-secretary of Finance, 31 Jan. 2008, no.
CPP2007/98M, Government Gazette, no. 27.
77 Convention between the Government of the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on
capital gains, Treaty No. 010276, Treaty Series 2008-201 and 2009-
123. This Convention has not yet taken effect.
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in part on Article 26(7)(b) of the Belgian/Dutch Tax
Convention,78 which states that the Belgian tax authori-
ties need to be convinced that the Dutch pension scheme
corresponds with a Belgian qualifying pension scheme
before the pension contributions are eligible for tax relief
in Belgium. The main obstacle occurs when employees
are posted to countries that have little or no domestic tax
facilities for pension accrual. In those situations, there
are no possibilities for continuing a Dutch pension
scheme.
In summary, we can conclude that foreign pension
schemes of non-mobile workers are required to meet
domestic tax rules, effectively cancelling out any tax
relief. Mobile workers are also granted only limited
cross-border tax relief in practice because host countries
can always impose the requirement that pension schemes
need to stay within the substantive limits of their domes-
tic tax rules. They hardly ever do, especially from a Dutch
perspective, so that tax relief for contributions to a Dutch
pension scheme that is continued in a foreign country is
a near impossibility. This impossibility, which is due to
the principle of fiscal autonomy, forms an impediment
to a European market for cross-border pension accrual.
Our argument is that, based on the ‘safeguarding’ Direc-
tive and the ‘Posting’ Regulation, the host country
should always, in a posting situation, grant tax relief
for the full contributions paid into a pension scheme
originating in a worker’s home country. Only then will a
worker not experience barriers in accruing pension in
posting situations. Contributions paid into foreign pen-
sion schemes by non-mobile workers should ideally
also qualify for tax relief irrespective of whether the
relief is broader than that offered under their own
domestic regime. This will long be a utopian thought,
however; it would be a departure from the principle of
fiscal autonomy.
There is a perhaps somewhat more realistic alter-
native. The EU could adopt a basic pension scheme
that would qualify for tax relief in every EU Member
State. This idea is also referred to as the ‘28th regime’.
The European Financial Services Round Table (EFR)
has proposed such a regime for top-up pension pro-
ducts in the third pillar.79 Second-pillar pensions could
be governed by a 28th regime as well, according to us.
The goal remains, after all, to allow every EU citizen
to create an adequate, tax-efficient retirement provi-
sion. It is irrelevant, in principle, whether the pension
is accrued in the second or third pillar, or whether the
citizen in question is employed, self-employed or a busi-
ness owner.
Another suggestion would be to devise a pension
scheme that meets the domestic tax laws of several
Member States. In order to achieve this, tax rules would
have to be mapped out systematically on a country-by-
country basis. Any corresponding elements should be
incorporated into the scheme, disregarding elements that
are at variance, for instance with regard to tax relief. The
figure below illustrates the idea. The horizontal bars
demonstrate the tax aspects of the pension systems in
the countries in question. Any overlaps between the
countries are incorporated into the pension scheme (the
vertical bar). The result is a pension scheme whose tax
aspects are acceptable in several Member States.
The feasibility of such a pension scheme has already
been explored for the Netherlands and Belgium and for
the Netherlands and the UK.80 The conclusion is that,
under circumstances, a fully employer-funded collective
DC scheme would qualify for tax relief in Belgium, the
UK and the Netherlands (see paragraph 4).
3.3.3. The Multi-pillar Pension Model with
a Compensating Layer
As mentioned at the start of this article, an adequate
retirement provision is crucial to the well-being of pen-
sioners in Europe. We also argued that cross-border
pension accrual has so far hardly come off the ground.
An adequate retirement provision stands or falls with the
tax relief associated with the accrual. In this regard, we
would refer to the Green Paper as well as this Journal that
mentions the so-called multi-pillar pension model with a
compensating layer (‘the multi-pillar model’).81
The multi-pillar model is based on the idea that the
level of tax relief offered in the second pillar and/or the
third pillar is dependent on the level of benefits accrued
in the other pillars. It can be left up to the individual
Member States to determine an adequate level for the
retirement provision (e.g., 70% of a beneficiary’s last-
earned salary or of their average pay). In concrete terms,
this means that every EU citizen will be allowed to accrue
an adequate retirement provision under tax-efficient con-
ditions, regardless of whether they are an employed or a
self-employed person. The multi-pillar model is ‘labour
form-neutral’ in that sense. What follows is an illustrative
example. A worker is paid a salary EUR 50,000; they are
entitled to a state pension of EUR 10,000 upon reaching
the age of 65. The standard has been set at 70% of a
worker’s last-earned salary, that is, 70% of EUR 50,000¼
EUR 35,000. This worker will have the option to accrue
EUR 25,000 in pension in the second pillar and/or the
third pillar under tax-efficient conditions. If the worker
78 Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the King-
dom of Belgium for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and
capital, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees, 2002, 596.
79 See <www.efr.be>.
80 See (in Dutch) F. Janse, ‘Een Nederlands-Belgische pensioenregeling:
niet langer een fiscale illusie’, Tijdschrift voor Pensioenvraagstukken 3
(2009): 93–99.
81 The Green Paper again refers to the person who developed this
model: G.J.B. Dietvorst, ‘Proposal for a Pension Model with a Com-
pensating Layer’, EC Tax Review 3 (2007): 142–145.
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has the prospect of accruing EUR 15,000 in pension
benefits in the second pillar, they are still eligible for tax
relief on EUR 10,000 in the third pillar. And if this person
does not accrue any second pillar pension (for instance
because they came to be self-employed), their tax relief
will be EUR 25,000 in the third pillar. This effectively
makes the three pension pillars communicating vessels.
The Dutch model partly takes this form. Tax relief is
granted in the third pillar if minimal or no pension
benefits are being accrued in the second pillar. The scale
of the tax relief is not such, however, that a retirement
provision can always be supplemented to 70% of a per-
son’s income.
The multi-pillar model can contribute to lifting bar-
riers to cross-border pension accrual in Europe. Member
States currently use different definitions of the scope and
substance of second-pillar and third-pillar pensions.
What is more, access to these pillars in the Member States
is not open to the same group of citizens. In the Nether-
lands, for instance, self-employed persons do not qualify
as ‘undertaking an occupational activity’, which bars
them from accruing pension under the second pillar.
Member States that have implemented the ‘broader’ IORP
definition of Article 6 do consider self-employed persons
as undertaking occupational activity.82 In order to pre-
vent such qualification differences, a suggestion might be
to open up the second and third pillars to all so that no
citizen experiences any obstacles in accruing an adequate
retirement provision. Whether a citizen is a worker, a
business owner or a self-employed person, they should
have access to the second and third pillars, and qualify for
tax relief to allow them to retire on a decent pension.
4. THE FEASIBILITY OF A UK/DUTCH TAX
QUALIFYING PENSION SCHEME
Commissioned by Holland Financial Centre for Retire-
ment Management,83 PwC performed a feasibility study
regarding a UK/Dutch tax qualifying DC pension
scheme.84 UK and Dutch tax pension systems show many
similarities. The idea of this study is to develop one single
pension scheme, that qualifies for tax relief in the UK as
well as in the Netherlands. To this end, firstly all relevant
UK and Dutch fiscal pension criteria were inventoried
and differences and similarities were described. All the
similarities were entered into the pension scheme so that
finally a blue print was established. This feasibility study
shows that a tax qualifying UK/Dutch pension scheme is
indeed very well possible. The study is too extensive to
discuss in this article in full. We therefore focus on a few
noticeable issues.
4.1. First Pillar Pension Offset
A Dutch tax qualifying pension scheme should take the
state pension into account. Effectively this means that the
first part of a salary does not qualify for pension accrual.
The reason for this is that the employee will already
receive a first pillar state pension in the future. The salary
that corresponds with this first pillar pension is not pen-
sionable from a tax point of view. Therefore, an offset has
to be taken into consideration.85 In the UK, such a
provision does not exist in tax law. However, it is not
forbidden to have such an offset in the pension scheme.
In order to have the pension scheme tax qualified in both
countries, an offset of EUR 15,000 is suggested.
4.2. Maximum Annual Pension Contributions
In the Netherlands, DC pension contributions are regu-
lated in such a way that a maximum percentage of the
pensionable wage is tax deductible. This percentage rises
during the age of the employee so that actuarial neutrality
between ages is achieved.86 In the UK the only applicable
maximum to the premium is that the total employer and
employee contribution is maximized to GBP 50,000. This
difference between the UK and the Netherlands can be
solved by using the Dutch applicable premium percen-
tages. By maximizing the pensionable salary to a level that
once you multiply this pensionable salary by the applic-
able maximum Dutch premium percentage, the outcome
is never higher that GBP 50,000, the pension scheme is
tax favourable in both countries. Hence, the Dutch as well
as the UK restrictions are taken into consideration at the
same time.
4.3. Maximum Pension
Besides the maximum allowable pension premium, a
maximum pension payment is also applicable from a
Dutch point of view. A pension annuity cannot be higher
than 100% of the final salary.87 Such a wage related
maximum does not exist in the UK. However, if the total
pension capital exceeds GBP 1,500,000, an extra tax
penalty is applicable to the employee. Both limitations
can easily be combined in a UK/Dutch pension scheme.
4.4. Further Research Pending
As said, a UK/Dutch tax qualifying pension scheme seems
possible. However, before such a scheme can be opera-
tional, other elements than tax have to be taken into
consideration. Therefore, further research is pending,
for instance with regard to social and labour law, com-
munication requirements, currency issues and supervi-
sory requirements. Certainly, barriers and obstacles will
arise but our estimation is that they will prove to be no
‘show stoppers’. Since an unrestricted tax acceptance of
foreign pension tax systems is not likely to arise anywhere
in the near future, a tax-efficient multi-country pension
scheme is the only way of really creating a market for pan-
European pension schemes.
82 We do not know of a review showing how the Member States have
implemented this article of the IORP Directive.
83 <www.hollandfinancialcentre.nl>.
84 Once the final study is finished in 2011, it is downloadable at
<www.hollandfinancialcentre.com>.
85 Article 18a, para. 8, Dutch Wage Tax Act 1964.
86 Article 18a, para. 3, Dutch Wage Tax Act 1964 and order by the
Dutch Under-secretary of Finance, 21 Dec. 2009, No. CPP2009/
1487M, Government Gazette, No. 20523.
87 Article 18a, para. 7, Dutch Wage Tax Act 1964.
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5. CONCLUSION
The cross-border activities of IORPs are slow in coming
off the ground. As the Commission states in the Green
Paper, they prevent the full realization of efficiency gains
arising from scale economies and competition, thereby
raising the cost of pensions and restricting consumer
choice.88 In this article, we hope to have demonstrated
that the obstacles to a well-functioning internal market
for IORPs are due mostly to differences in national and
European laws. At European level, there is no clear defi-
nition of the concept of cross-border activity, nor are
there any harmonized supervision rules. There are sub-
stantial differences at national level due to the complex
interaction between EU and domestic laws. In addition,
tax laws form a considerable obstacle to achieving a fully
fledged internal market for pensions.
What is needed to overcome these obstacles is a revi-
sion of the IORP Directive, better convergence of
supervision and more clarity about national differences.
A tailor-made European supervision regime for IORPs
would be progress. It would also be useful from an inter-
nal market perspective if the Commission were to
indicate – even in the broadest of outlines – what provi-
sions of national law do and do not come under the
concept of social and labour legislation.89 Finally, it
would be a step in the right direction if the Member States
were to accept the tax aspects of each other’s pension
schemes at European level (applying the principle of
mutual recognition) and allow full tax relief for pension
contributions, at least in the hands of mobile workers.
Until then, initiatives in establishing a multi-country tax-
efficient pension scheme are more than welcome and
should be encouraged.
88 Quoted from the Green Paper.
89 Having regard to the sovereignty of the Member States.
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